There have been lots of seminars, discussions and numerous articles on  the recent “liquidity” crisis in our banking system. Rising imports,  stagnating exports, capital flight and unspent capital expenditures,  among others, have been identified as the primary reasons for the  current crisis. Some have also identified the currency note shortage  last Dashain when depositors could not withdraw adequate amounts of cash  from their respective banks as being another critical reason for the  current liquidity problems because many depositors could have lost faith  in the commercial banks’ ability to meet their demand for deposits. In  this article, I will try to shed some light on the role of banks as  financial intermediaries where they take short-term deposits and provide  long-term loans, and the potential liquidity crisis that banks could  face from this inherent mismatch between their assets and liabilities.
 A commercial bank is primarily involved in mobilising deposits and  providing loans, i.e., they channel deposits from individuals into loans  for borrowers. In the process, they earn a profit from the spread  between the average cost of their deposit aka “cost of funds” and the  average lending yield. The higher the spread between the lending yield  and the cost of funds, the higher will be the bank’s profit. Banks can  mobilise deposits either through low-cost current and savings accounts  (CASA) or through high cost fixed deposit (FD) accounts. So it’s in a  bank’s interest to mobilise as much deposits as possible from low-cost  CASA to widen their interest spread. However, since there is no  withdrawal limit on CASA (as they are demand deposits), the average  deposit on such accounts can be highly volatile. FD accounts, on the  other hand, have fixed tenures, so banks can plan beforehand when and by  how much there could be potential deposit withdrawals from these  accounts. Because of the respective trade-offs between the cost and  volatility of both CASA and FD accounts, commercial banks try to find  the optimum balance between the two whereby they can minimise their cost  of funds.
 When a commercial bank mobilises deposits, it can invest that amount  either in liquid assets such as government bonds or lend it out to  borrowers who are interested in either meeting their working capital  needs or investing in manufacturing businesses, real estate, hydro power  and so forth. Generally, government bonds (read T-bills) have a lower  yield than the average lending rate on the loan portfolio of commercial  banks. So it’s in a bank’s interest to allocate as much of their assets  to higher yielding loans than government bonds. However, because most of  these capital intensive manufacturing plants, hydro projects and real  estate ventures have long durations, banks have to wait for a  substantial period before they get their principal back. T-bills, on the  other hand, have a lower maturity period, and they can even be used as  collateral to borrow funds from the central bank. Hence, like in the  case of deposits, banks try to find the optimum balance between high  yielding but longer duration loans with low yielding but liquid  government bonds. 
 Now, as mentioned above, it’s in a bank’s interest to mobilise as much  deposits from low-cost CASA as possible. As a demand deposit, funds in  CASA have immediate maturity; however, banks believe that depositors’  unpredictable needs for cash are unlikely to occur at the same time.  With this belief, they are able to make loans to projects with a long  duration. In the process, banks are borrowing short-term and lending  long, which results in an asset-liability mismatch. Almost all banks  have some sort of an asset-liability mismatch on their balance sheets.  When banks do lend out demand deposits for long-term projects, a  systemic risk can arise in the banking system if an individual bank  cannot meet the withdrawal demand of its depositors. Trust is paramount  in the banking system. Every depositor trusts banks to deliver cash when  they come forward with a withdrawal slip. If the depositors feel that  their savings is at risk, then a sudden surge in deposit withdrawals and  the bank’s inability to meet the unexpected demand can lead to the  self-fulfilling crisis of “bank run”.
 One way out for banks would be to follow a “narrow bank” concept, i.e.,  invest all their demand deposits in short-term assets. However, this  not only affects the profitability of a bank due to lower yields on  short-term assets but also reduces its ability to lend out to productive  sectors such as manufacturing, and that affects the overall economy.  Hence, the concept of narrow banking has been discredited in most  countries (however, because of the recent financial crisis, voices have  emerged to move towards narrow banking).
 In the context of the ongoing liquidity crisis in Nepal, the trust of  depositors in the banking system has been undermined due to the currency  shortage last Dashain. As a result, many depositors who had to haggle  with bank officials to withdraw their own savings during the festival  haven’t channelled their savings back into the banking system. According  to Diamond and Dybvig’s seminal research on banking crises, one of the  most potent tools to build the general public’s trust in the banking  system is deposit insurance. As of now, there is no provision of deposit  insurance from the government side although the last budget did mention  it.
 To address the problem of an asset-liability mismatch in Indian banks,  which is stifling infrastructure development, the Indian government  announced the concept of “take-out” financing during the last budget of  2009/10. Under the Indian government’s take-out financing scheme, India  Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFCL) — an Indian government  owned entity — will buy out long-term loans from banks. Minimising  asset-liability mismatches, this scheme enables banks to enter into  long-term project financing as they can sell their loans to the IIFCL  after a certain time frame. Though the recent initiative of Nepal Rastra  Bank to provide refinancing is a welcome step, a similar kind of  take-out financing scheme is necessary to mitigate the liquidity  problems that arises from an asset-liability mismatch in banks as well  as encourage banks to lend towards productive sectors.
 From the bank’s side, there should also be proper and rigorous focus on  asset-liability management. Most commercial banks in Nepal don’t follow  the concept of duration management in their balance sheets. Much of  their senior management’s focus is towards increasing the absolute  volume of deposits and loans rather than properly managing  asset-liability to maximise profits. When mangers focus only on  increasing the deposit or loan volume, adverse interest rate movements  can seriously undermine a bank’s profitability and its asset quality.
 However to be fair to bankers, they also don’t have tools to properly  manage the mismatch between assets and liabilities. Generally, interest  rate derivatives, currency derivatives and swaps are used extensively by  foreign banks to match their assets with their liabilities. With Nepal  Rastra Bank’s recent decision to allow commercial banks to use  derivative instruments, I am hopeful that in the days ahead, banks will  be better equipped to deal with asset-liability mismatch problems.
 
This article was first published in The Kathmandu Post on April 12, 2010
Link: http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/04/11/Oped/Wheres-all-the-money/207127/
Monday, April 12, 2010
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